% This file was created with JabRef 2.6b. % Encoding: Cp1252 @INPROCEEDINGS{Camenisch2008, author = {Camenisch, Jan and Gro\ss, Thomas and Heydt-Benjamin, Thomas S.}, title = {Rethinking accountable privacy supporting servicess}, booktitle = {DIM '08: Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Digital identity management}, year = {2008}, pages = {1--8}, address = {New York, NY, USA}, publisher = {ACM}, abstract = {As privacy concerns among consumers rise, service providers will increasingly want to provide services that support privacy enhancing technologies. At the same time, providers of commercial services require the security of identifying misbehaving users. For instance, users that do not pay their bill can be held accountable for their behavior. We propose a scheme that permits privacy support while retaining accountability. In our proposed scheme an honest user may enjoy full anonymity, but dishonest users who do not pay their bill have their identity revealed. In contrast to existing revocable anonymity systems, our proposed scheme requires less trust in an external authority, while simultaneously making accountability easier (and less costly) to achieve. We contribute the concept of a time capsule, that is, a verifiable encryption with timed and revocable decryptability.}, doi = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1456424.1456426}, isbn = {978-1-60558-294-8}, location = {Alexandria, Virginia, USA}, timestamp = {2009.10.07} } @INPROCEEDINGS{Danev2009, author = {Danev, Boris and Heydt-Benjamin, Thomas S. and Capkun, Srdjan}, title = {Physical-layer Identification of RFID Devices}, booktitle = {USENIX Security '09: Proceedings of the 18th USENIX Security Symposium}, year = {2009}, pages = {125--136}, publisher = {USENIX}, location = {Montreal, Canada}, timestamp = {2009.09.29} } @MISC{feder2008, author = {Feder, Barnaby J.}, title = {A Heart Device Is Found Vulnerable to Hacker Attacks}, howpublished = {The New York Times}, month = {March}, year = {2008}, keywords = {heydt-benjamin, implantable, medical, devices}, timestamp = {2009.09.29} } @ARTICLE{Halperin2008a, author = {Daniel Halperin and Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin and Kevin Fu and Tadayoshi Kohno and William H. Maisel}, title = {Security and Privacy for Implantable Medical Devices}, journal = {IEEE Pervasive Computing}, year = {2008}, volume = {7}, pages = {30--39}, number = {1}, month = {January}, __markedentry = {[hey]}, abstract = {{Protecting implantable medical devices against attack without compromising patient health requires balancing security and privacy goals with traditional goals such as safety and utility. Implantable medical devices monitor and treat physiological conditions within the body. These devices - including pacemakers, implantable cardiac defibrillators (ICDs), drug delivery systems, and neurostimulators - can help manage a broad range of ailments, such as cardiac arrhythmia, diabetes, and Parkinson's disease. IMDs' pervasiveness continues to swell, with upward of 25 million US citizens currently reliant on them for life-critical functions. Growth is spurred by geriatric care of the aging baby-boomer generation, and new therapies continually emerge for chronic conditions ranging from pediatric type 1 diabetes to anorgasmia and other sexual dysfunctions. Moreover, the latest IMDs support delivery of telemetry for remote monitoring over long-range, high-bandwidth wireless links, and emerging devices will communicate with other interoperating IMDs.}, keywords={data privacy, patient monitoring, prosthetics, security of dataParkinson's disease, anorgasmia, cardiac arrhythmia, drug delivery systems, geriatric care, high-bandwidth wireless links, implantable cardiac defibrillators, implantable medical devices privacy, implantable medical devices security, neurostimulators, pacemakers, patient health, pediatric type 1 diabetes, physiological conditions, remote monitoring, sexual dysfunctions, telemetry}}, doi = {10.1109/MPRV.2008.16}, keywords = {{data privacy, patient monitoring, prosthetics, security of dataParkinson's disease, anorgasmia, cardiac arrhythmia, drug delivery systems, geriatric care, high-bandwidth wireless links, implantable cardiac defibrillators, implantable medical devices privacy, implantable medical devices security, neurostimulators, pacemakers, patient health, pediatric type 1 diabetes, physiological conditions, remote monitoring, sexual dysfunctions, telemetry}}, publisher = {IEEE}, timestamp = {2009.09.29}, url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=4431854} } @INPROCEEDINGS{Halperin2008, author = {Daniel Halperin and Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin and Benjamin Ransford and Shane S. Clark and Benessa Defend and Will Morgan and Kevin Fu and Tadayoshi Kohno and William H. Maisel M.D.}, title = {Pacemakers and Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators: Software Radio Attacks and Zero-Power Defenses}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2008 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy}, year = {2008}, pages = {{129-142}}, month = {May}, publisher = {IEEE}, __markedentry = {[hey]}, abstract = {{Our study analyzes the security and privacy properties of an implantable cardioverter defibrillator (ICD). Introduced to the U.S. market in 2003, this model of ICD includes pacemaker technology and is designed to communicate wirelessly with a nearby external programmer in the 175 kHz frequency range. After partially reverse-engineering the ICD's communications protocol with an oscilloscope and a software radio, we implemented several software radio-based attacks that could compromise patient safety and patient privacy. Motivated by our desire to improve patient safety, and mindful of conventional trade-offs between security and power consumption for resource-constrained devices, we introduce three new zero-power defenses based on RF power harvesting. Two of these defenses are human-centric, bringing patients into the loop with respect to the security and privacy of their implantable medical devices (IMDs). Our contributions provide a scientific baseline for understanding the potential security and privacy risks of current and future IMDs, and introduce human-perceptible and zero-power mitigation techniques that address those risks. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first in our community to use general-purpose software radios to analyze and attack previously unknown radio communications protocols.}}, doi = {{10.1109/SP.2008.31}}, keywords = {{cardiovascular system, defibrillators, health and safety, pacemakers, programmable circuits, security, software radio, terrorismRF power harvesting, human-perceptible mitigation techniques, implantable cardioverter defibrillators, implantable medical devices, oscilloscope, pacemaker technology, partial reverse-engineering, patient privacy, patient safety, power consumption, radiocommunications protocol, security aspects, software radio attacks, zero-power defenses}}, timestamp = {2009.09.29}, url = {http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=4531149&isnumber=4531132}, www_pdf_url = {http://www.secure-medicine.org/icd-study/icd-study.pdf} } @INPROCEEDINGS{Heydt-Benjamin2007, author = {Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin and Dan V. Bailey and Kevin Fu and Ari Juels and Tom OHare}, title = {Vulnerabilities in First-Generation {RFID}-enabled Credit Cards}, booktitle = {Proceedings of Eleventh International Conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security}, year = {2007}, pages = {2-14}, address = {Lowlands, Scarborough, Trinidad/Tobago}, month = {February}, __markedentry = {[hey]}, abstract = {RFID-enabled credit cards are widely deployed in the United States and other countries, but no public study has thoroughly analyzed the mechanisms that provide both security and privacy. Using samples from a variety of RFID-enabled credit cards, our study observes that (1) the cardholder’s name and often credit card number and expiration are leaked in plaintext to unauthenticated readers, (2) our homemade device costing around $150 effectively clones one type of skimmed cards thus providing a proof-of-concept implementation for the RF replay attack, (3) information revealed by the RFID transmission cross contaminates the security of RFID and non-RFID payment contexts, and (4) RFID-enabled credit cards are susceptible in various degrees to a range of other traditional RFID attacks such as skimming and relaying.}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-540-77366-5}, keywords = {security; RFID}, slides_url = {{http://prisms.cs.umass.edu/~kevinfu/talks/FC-RFID-CC-slides.pdf}}, timestamp = {2009.09.29}, url = {http://www.springerlink.com/content/e7324164535up092/fulltext.pdf}, video_url = {http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xPkzFETzueQ} } @INPROCEEDINGS{Heydt-Benjamin2006a, author = {Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin and Hee-Jin Chae and Benessa Defend and Kevin Fu}, title = {Privacy for Public Transportation}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the Sixth Workshop on Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET 2006)}, year = {2006}, address = {Cambridge, UK}, month = {June}, publisher = {Springer}, __markedentry = {[hey]}, abstract = {We propose an application of recent advances in e-cash, anonymous credentials, and proxy re-encryption to the problem of privacy in public transit systems with electronic ticketing. We discuss some of the interesting features of transit ticketing as a problem domain, and provide an architecture sufficient for the needs of a typical metropolitan transit system. Our system maintains the security required by the transit authority and the user while significantly increasing passenger privacy. Our hybrid approach to ticketing allows use of passive RFID transponders as well as higher powered computing devices such as smartphones or PDAs. We demonstrate security and privacy features offered by our hybrid system that are unavailable in a homogeneous passive transponder architecture, and which are advantageous for users of passive as well as active devices.}, bookurl = {http://petworkshop.org/2006/}, timestamp = {2009.09.29}, www_pdf_url = {http://petworkshop.org/2006/preproc/preproc_01.pdf}, www_section = {Misc} } @INPROCEEDINGS{Heydt-Benjamin2006, author = {Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin and Andrei Serjantov and Benessa Defend}, title = {Nonesuch: a mix network with sender unobservability}, booktitle = {{Proceedings of the Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2006)}}, year = {2006}, pages = {1--8}, address = {New York, NY, USA}, publisher = {ACM Press}, __markedentry = {[hey]}, abstract = {Oblivious submission to anonymity systems is a process by which a message may be submitted in such a way that nei- ther the anonymity network nor a global passive adversary may determine that a valid message has been sent. We present Nonesuch: a mix network with steganographic sub- mission and probabilistic identification and attenuation of cover traffic. In our system messages are submitted as ste- gotext hidden inside Usenet postings. The steganographic extraction mechanism is such that the the vast majority of the Usenet postings which do not contain keyed stegotext will produce meaningless output which serves as cover traf- fic, thus increasing the anonymity of the real messages. This cover traffic is subject to probabilistic attenuation in which nodes have only a small probability of distinguishing cover messages from “real” messages. This attenuation prevents cover traffic from travelling through the network in an infi- nite loop, while making it infeasible for an entrance node to distinguish senders.}, doi = {http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/1179601.1179603}, isbn = {1-59593-556-8}, location = {Alexandria, Virginia, USA}, timestamp = {2009.09.29}, www_pdf_url = {http://www.cs.umass.edu/~tshb/wpes40-heydt-benjamin.pdf}, www_section = {Anonymous communication} } @INPROCEEDINGS{Rasmussen2009, author = {Kasper Bonne Rasmussen and Claude Castelluccia and Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin and Srdjan Capkun}, title = {Proximity-based Access Control for Implantable Medical Devices}, booktitle = {Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)}, year = {2009}, publisher = {ACM Press}, timestamp = {2009.09.29} } @MISC{schwartz2006, author = {Schwartz, John}, title = {Researchers See Privacy Pitfalls in No-Swipe Credit Cards}, howpublished = {The New York Times}, month = {October}, year = {2006}, keywords = {heydt-benjamin, RFID, credit, card}, timestamp = {2009.09.29} } @comment{jabref-meta: selector_publisher:} @comment{jabref-meta: selector_author:} @comment{jabref-meta: selector_journal:} @comment{jabref-meta: selector_keywords:}